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ECB-ART-49172
Sci Rep 2021 May 18;111:10552. doi: 10.1038/s41598-021-89979-7.
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Egg-trading worms start reciprocation with caution, respond with confidence and care about partners' quality.

Lorenzi MC , Schleicherová D , Robles-Guerrero FG , Dumas M , Araguas A .


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Conditional reciprocity (help someone who helped you before) explains the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals who take turns helping each other. Reciprocity is vulnerable to exploitations, and players are expected to identify uncooperative partners who do not return the help they received. We tested this prediction in the simultaneously hermaphroditic worm, Ophryotrocha diadema, which engages in mutual egg donations by alternating sexual roles (one worm releases' eggs and the other fertilizes them). We set up dyads with different cooperativeness expectations; partners were either the same or a different body size (body size predicts clutch size). Large worms offered larger clutches and did so sooner when paired with large rather than small partners. They also released smaller egg clutches when they started egg donations than when they responded to a partners' donation, fulfilling the prediction that a players' first move will be prudent. Finally, behavioral bodily interactions were more frequent between more size-dissimilar worms, suggesting that worms engaged in low-cost behavioral exchanges before investing in such costly moves as egg donations. These results support the hypothesis that simultaneously hermaphroditic worms follow a conditional reciprocity paradigm and solve the conflict over sexual roles by sharing the costs of reproduction via the male and the female functions.

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References [+] :
André, Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma. 2007, Pubmed